<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>cybercrime.club</title><link>https://cybercrime.club/tags/prompt-injection/</link><description>Infrastructure security news for people who build infrastructure.</description><generator>Hugo -- gohugo.io</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Sun, 07 Jun 2026 11:09:26 -0400</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://cybercrime.club/tags/prompt-injection/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Claude Code's GitHub Action: One Malicious Issue Could Hijack Any Public Repo</title><link>https://cybercrime.club/posts/claude-code-github-action-bot-bypass-prompt-injection-supply-chain/</link><pubDate>Sun, 07 Jun 2026 11:09:26 -0400</pubDate><guid>https://cybercrime.club/posts/claude-code-github-action-bot-bypass-prompt-injection-supply-chain/</guid><description>A permission bypass chained with prompt injection in Anthropic's Claude Code GitHub Action let a single crafted issue make the agent leak CI secrets and OIDC request tokens — a clean path to poisoning the action's own supply chain. Patched in v1.0.94.</description><category>supply-chain</category></item></channel></rss>