Broadcom published VMSA-2026-0009 on November 19, 2026. It fixes CVE-2026-123890, a CVSS 9.8 authentication bypass in the VMware Directory Service (vmdird), the LDAP identity store behind vCenter single sign-on. Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) and Mandiant report that a suspected China-linked espionage group exploited the flaw as a zero-day from early September, more than two months before a patch existed. Google tracks the group as ARMORY CASTLE, and some reporting links it to UNC5221. Broadcom lists no workaround, so upgrading is the only fix.
The important detail for anyone who thought July closed this hole: GTIG saw the exploit tool used successfully against a vCenter server already patched for CVE-2026-59309. That was the earlier vmdird authentication bypass fixed in VMSA-2026-0006. Broadcom’s FAQ confirms that the new fix is needed even on systems that applied the July update.
Technical details
- CVE-2026-123890 (CVSS 3.1: 9.8). Authentication bypass in the vCenter Directory Service. An attacker who can reach vCenter over the network can skip authentication and get privileged access to the directory. Broadcom says vCenter is vulnerable whether or not Enhanced Linked Mode is configured.
- BONESAW is a custom Go tool for the attack. Mandiant says it works against vCenter 7.x and 8.x. In the observed intrusion it did the following:
- exploited CVE-2026-123890 against vmdird;
- stole the directory’s Lightning Memory-Mapped Database (LMDB) file;
- pulled the SAML token-signing material (the STS signing certificate and private key) out of the stolen database;
- created a new SSO administrator account.
- The BONESAW binary has a build timestamp of July 13, 2026. That is about two weeks before VMSA-2026-0006 shipped, though build metadata can be forged. Broadcom has not independently confirmed exploitation. The in-the-wild claim comes from GTIG’s incident-response work.
Stealing the signing key is what makes this worse than an ordinary authentication bypass. With the STS key, an attacker can forge SAML tokens for any vSphere identity offline, a “golden SAML” attack. Patching does not invalidate tokens forged this way, and neither does deleting the rogue admin account. Only replacing the signing certificate does that.
VMSA-2026-0009 also fixes four lower-severity bugs:
| CVE | Product | Issue | CVSS |
|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-123891 | SDDC Manager | Authenticated SQL injection | 8.1 |
| CVE-2026-123892 | SDDC Manager | Authenticated command injection | 7.2 |
| CVE-2026-123893 | SDDC Manager | Local privilege escalation to root | 6.7 |
| CVE-2026-123894 | VMware Tools for Windows | SAML token signature bypass (Guest Alias mapping) | 6.7 |
Fixed versions
- vCenter Server: 9.1.1.0200, 9.0.2.0200, 8.0 U3m. Some secondary sources list 9.0.2.0100 for vCenter 9.0, but that is the SDDC Manager build number. Check the Broadcom response matrix.
- vCenter 7.0: affected, with no public fix. Customers on extended support have to request a patch through Broadcom Support.
- SDDC Manager: 9.1.1.0200, 9.0.2.0100, 5.2.5.
- VMware Tools for Windows: 13.1.5 and 12.5.5. The 32-bit Windows build 12.4.10 ships with 12.5.5.
- Telco Cloud Platform / Infrastructure: see Broadcom KB 463116.
Impact
vCenter controls every host, VM, datastore and distributed switch it manages. An SSO administrator can snapshot and exfiltrate domain controller disks, install rogue VMs, and push to ESXi hosts. China-nexus groups have spent years building ESXi and vCenter backdoors because these appliances rarely run EDR and their logs are seldom collected. Organizations that patched aggressively in July should not assume they were protected: the exploitation window here runs from September to now.
What to do now
- Patch immediately to the fixed builds above. Limit access to vCenter’s management interfaces (443, plus the LDAP ports 389/636 used by vmdird) to a dedicated admin network. vCenter should never be reachable from the internet or from general user VLANs.
- Hunt for compromise:
- Review the SSO users and groups (
Administrators,SystemConfiguration.Administrators) for accounts created since early September. - Check the vmdird and STS logs under
/var/log/vmware/vmdird/and/var/log/vmware/sso/for unusual binds and logins from accounts nobody recognizes. - Look for unexpected reads or copies of the vmdird LMDB data file (
/storage/db/vmware-vmdir/data.mdb).
- Review the SSO users and groups (
- If you find anything, assume the signing key has been stolen:
- Replace the STS signing certificate and reset the [email protected] password and other SSO credentials.
- Rotate service-account secrets stored in vCenter.
- Review ESXi hosts for persistence such as malicious VIBs and changes to
/etc/rc.local.d/.
- Upgrade or isolate vCenter 7.0 if you are not on extended support. There is no public fix for it.