InfoGuard Labs researchers Dario Weiss, Manuel Feifel, and Olivier Becker published a coordinated disclosure on Monday detailing seven vulnerabilities in SEPPmail Secure E-Mail Gateway, a widely deployed enterprise email-encryption and policy appliance. The chain of bugs lets an unauthenticated attacker take full control of the appliance, read every mail flowing through it, and use it as a beachhead into the internal network.

The headliner is CVE-2026-2743, a CVSS 10.0 path-traversal-to-RCE in the User Web Interface’s large file transfer (LFT) feature. Six additional flaws cover auth-bypass, deserialization, eval injection, and template-engine injection — and four of them score 8.8 or higher.

The vulnerabilities

CVECVSSType
CVE-2026-274310.0Path traversal in LFT -> arbitrary file write -> RCE
CVE-2026-441259.3Missing authorization on multiple GINA UI endpoints
CVE-2026-441289.3Unauthenticated eval injection (Perl) in /api.app/template
CVE-2026-441269.2Deserialization of untrusted data -> unauthenticated RCE
CVE-2026-441278.8Unauthenticated path traversal in /api.app/attachment/preview
CVE-2026-441298.3Template-engine injection (depends on enabled plugins)
CVE-2026-78646.9Env-variable disclosure via unauthenticated GINA UI endpoint

The CVE-2026-2743 exploit chain

The path traversal alone is just arbitrary file write — useful, but the appliance runs the writer as the unprivileged nobody user. The interesting trick is how InfoGuard turned that into a Perl reverse shell:

  1. Overwrite /etc/syslog.conf. The nobody user happens to have write access to syslogd’s config file. The traversal lets the attacker drop a malicious config that pipes log lines into a Perl one-liner.
  2. Wait for the SIGHUP. Syslogd only re-reads its config on SIGHUP. The appliance doesn’t expose a way to send SIGHUP directly — but it uses newsyslog for log rotation, which runs every 15 minutes via cron and sends SIGHUP automatically when a logfile exceeds its size limit.
  3. Bloat the log. SEPPMaillog has a 10,000 KB rotation threshold. The researchers filled it by hammering the web interface with requests. Once newsyslog rotates and SIGHUPs syslogd, the planted config loads.
  4. Get a Perl-based reverse shell running as the syslogd process. From there: full appliance takeover, persistent C2, and the ability to read all mail traffic.

The 15-minute cron cycle is a soft constraint, not a stopper — the attacker just has to wait one round.

CVE-2026-44128: the easier RCE

For attackers who don’t want to wait for cron, CVE-2026-44128 is more direct. The /api.app/template endpoint passes the user-supplied upldd parameter straight into a Perl eval() with no sanitization. Unauthenticated, single-request RCE. Anyone who’s ever stared at a Perl codebase will recognize the shape immediately.

Impact

SEPPmail is a Swiss vendor with significant deployment across DACH-region enterprises, government, and healthcare. The appliance sits inline with mail flow and holds decryption keys for S/MIME and OpenPGP — meaning a compromised gateway gives an attacker plaintext access to every message that transits it, even when end-users believe encryption is end-to-end. It’s also typically network-positioned with reach into both the DMZ and internal mail infrastructure, making it a high-value pivot.

There are no public reports of active exploitation yet, but the InfoGuard write-up includes enough detail that working exploits should be expected within days.

Mitigation

Patch immediately. SEPPmail shipped fixes in stages:

  • CVE-2026-44128 — fixed in 15.0.2.1
  • CVE-2026-44126 — fixed in 15.0.3
  • All remaining CVEs (including CVE-2026-2743) — fixed in 15.0.4

If you can’t patch to 15.0.4 immediately:

  • Block external access to /api.app/template, /api.app/attachment/preview, and the LFT upload endpoints at your reverse proxy or WAF.
  • Audit /etc/syslog.conf on the appliance for unexpected entries (anything piping to |perl, |sh, or |/usr/bin/... is suspicious).
  • Watch for spikes in SEPPMaillog size — the disclosed exploit deliberately bloats it to force rotation.
  • Inspect cron and newsyslog.conf for tampering.

This disclosure also comes weeks after SEPPmail patched CVE-2026-27441 (CVSS 9.5), an OS command-injection bug. Two critical-severity advisories in a single month is a strong signal to prioritize this appliance in your patch queue and revisit your mail-gateway threat model — particularly the assumption that an inline encryption appliance is trustworthy.

References