An attacker spent nearly two weeks walking into customer AWS accounts through the front door those customers had built for Qubole, the big-data platform now owned by Idera. No vulnerability was involved. The attacker had control of two IAM users in Qubole’s own AWS account, and any customer role that still trusted that account let them in.
Wiz published the findings on November 9 with Sentra, which spotted the activity first, and Google Mandiant. They say the campaign ran from October 14 to October 26, 2026 and hit “dozens” of organizations. How the attacker got the Qubole credentials has not been disclosed. As of November 11, neither Qubole nor Idera had issued a public statement, and AWS had published no bulletin.
On November 12, Expedia Group confirmed that attackers reached its systems through a compromised “third-party data platform provider” and that other companies were hit by the same supply-chain attack. Expedia did not name the vendor. Qubole was a former Expedia supplier, but neither Expedia nor the researchers have publicly confirmed that the two incidents are connected. An extortion crew calling itself n0n, which the Risky Business newsletter reported had claimed the Qubole intrusion, says it holds 333 million Expedia account records and more than 830 million loyalty-program rows from 35 programs. Those numbers come from the crew and are unverified.
How the attack worked
Qubole, like most SaaS data platforms, asked customers to create an IAM role whose trust policy allows sts:AssumeRole from Qubole’s AWS account (805246085872), usually with an sts:ExternalId condition. That is the pattern AWS recommends for third-party access. It also means the customer’s security depends entirely on the vendor’s account staying secure.
- Role assumption. On October 14 the attacker began calling
sts:AssumeRoleagainst customer integration roles, using Qubole IAM user principalAIDA3W7DIFLYOLTK63SFS, first from Mullvad VPN address45.83.220.211. A second Qubole IAM user,AIDAJYRRH5Y3A7AAJM2HW, is also listed as an indicator. Every call carried the correct External ID and succeeded. The External ID guards against confused-deputy attacks, not against compromise of the vendor itself: the vendor stores it, it is often committed to IaC, and it appears in plaintext in CloudTrail. - Secret harvesting. Inside each account the attacker dumped Secrets Manager values, SSM Parameter Store values and Lambda environment variables. Sentra saw about 100 passwords and keys collected in seven minutes in one environment. CSO Online reports that harvested material included AWS, Entra ID and Okta credentials, which gives the attacker a way out of AWS and into identity providers.
- S3 exfiltration. Buckets reachable by the role were listed and copied wholesale. Millions of files were reportedly taken from at least one customer.
- Read-only. Sentra recorded no write actions in the environments it examined. The goal was theft and, it appears, extortion, not destruction.
What made this so damaging was dormancy. Wiz and Sentra say most of the abused roles had been inactive for months, some since spring. These were customers who had tried Qubole or left it and never removed the role or its trust relationship. Nobody was watching a role that nobody used.
Wiz also saw a separate actor, October 8–11, using customer-owned access keys apparently created for Qubole integrations; it is not linked to the main campaign.
Detection
Wiz recommends hunting in every account that has, or ever had, a Qubole integration role, going back to October 1, 2026:
AssumeRoleevents whereuserIdentity.accountId = 805246085872andsourceIPAddressis not an AWS address. Legitimate Qubole traffic comes from AWS infrastructure.AssumeRolebyAIDA3W7DIFLYOLTK63SFSorAIDAJYRRH5Y3A7AAJM2HWfrom non-AWS IPs, and anything from45.83.220.211.- Follow-on
GetSecretValue,GetParameter(s)with decryption,GetFunctionConfiguration, andListBuckets/ListObjectsfrom those sessions.
CloudTrail management events record the role assumption and bucket listing but not object reads. You need S3 data events or server access logs for that, and Wiz says several victims had neither. If yours didn’t, treat every bucket the role could read as exfiltrated.
What to do now
- Find every third-party trust. Enumerate roles whose trust policy names an external account (IAM Access Analyzer external-access findings do this across an organization). Delete any whose vendor you no longer use. Look at
RoleLastUsed: a vendor role idle for 90 days should be removed. - If you trusted 805246085872, revoke active sessions (attach an
aws:TokenIssueTimedeny policy, or delete the role), then rotate every secret the role could read: Secrets Manager, SSM SecureStrings, Lambda env vars, and any Entra ID or Okta credentials stored there. Also rotate long-lived keys created for the integration. - Narrow the trust policies you keep. Add
aws:SourceIp/aws:SourceVpceor vendor-published IP conditions, use a unique External ID per role and rotate it after an incident, and scope permissions to specific buckets and secret ARNs, not*. - Turn on S3 data events for buckets that hold sensitive data, so the next investigation can say what was actually read.
This is the Vercel/Context.ai OAuth breach pattern moved into IAM: standing vendor trust that nobody revisits turns one vendor compromise into dozens of breaches.
References
- Wiz: Trusted by Default: Qubole Cross-Account Access Abused in the Wild
- The Register: Attackers backdoor trusted AWS integrations to steal secrets
- CSO Online: Qubole supply chain attack exposed AWS, Entra ID, and Okta credentials
- BleepingComputer: Hackers exploit trusted AWS access to breach multiple cloud environments
- The Hacker News: Hackers Exploit Qubole’s Trusted AWS Access to Breach Customer Accounts
- Skift: Expedia Confirms Cyberattack Through Third-Party Vendor
- Security Affairs: Extortion Group Claims Theft of Nearly One Billion Expedia Traveler Records