CISA added CVE-2026-115731, a deserialization flaw in Puppet Server’s report-processing path, to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on November 17. Perforce shipped fixes on November 3, and reporting indicates exploitation was first observed on November 4, roughly a day after the patch dropped. Federal civilian agencies have until December 1 to remediate.
This one deserves Tier-0 treatment. The Puppet server pushes configuration, and usually secrets, to every managed node. An attacker who owns it can push a catalog to the whole fleet.
What happened
Puppet agents submit run reports to the server via PUT /puppet/v3/report. According to the OpenVox project’s advisory (GHSA-ffr6-rwpm-p5wq), the event data in those reports goes through Puppet’s rich-data JSON converter. The converter reads an attacker-supplied __ptype value, resolves it with Types::TypeParser.singleton.parse(type_value, @loader), and then calls .create(value) on the resolved type. Because the client controls both the type and its constructor arguments, it can instantiate objects it should never reach. That gives arbitrary Ruby execution as the puppet service user. The advisory’s proof of concept runs touch /tmp/pwned on the server.
The weakness is CWE-502. The CNA scores it 9.4 under CVSS 4.0, and some aggregators list 9.9.
The prerequisite is a valid client certificate signed by the Puppet CA. That sounds like a high bar, but in practice it often isn’t:
- Autosigning. Many environments use
autosign = true, or policy-based autosigning with weak checks, so that ephemeral cloud instances and CI runners can enroll on their own. In those setups anyone who can reach port 8140 can mint their own cert. - Any compromised node. Every managed server already has a valid agent cert in
/etc/puppetlabs/puppet/ssl/. If an attacker gets onto one web server, they can use that cert to move up to the Puppet server, and from there out to every other node.
The same release fixed a second bug reported by Neodyme: CVE-2026-115732, a certificate-name authorization bypass (CVSS 4.0 9.0). CISA has not added it to KEV, but combined with the deserialization bug it makes the certificate prerequisite matter even less. Treat both as one patch.
Affected and fixed versions
| Product | Fixed in |
|---|---|
| Puppet Enterprise 2026.x | 2026.0.1 |
| Puppet Enterprise 2025.x | 2025.12.1 |
| Puppet Enterprise 2023.8 LTS | 2023.8.13 |
| Puppet Core 9.x / 8.x | 9.1.3 / 8.22.2 |
| OpenVox server 9.x / 8.x | 9.2.0 / 8.18.0 (≤ 9.1.0 and ≤ 8.17.0 affected) |
A public PoC targeting OpenVox appeared shortly after the fix. Debian and Red Hat are tracking the CVE for their packaged builds, so check your distro’s tracker if you run puppetserver from OS repositories.
Impact
Code execution on the Puppet server as puppet gives an attacker:
- Fleet-wide code execution. They can modify the code directory, Hiera data or the node classifier, and every agent will run the result as root on its next check-in (default: every 30 minutes).
- Secrets. Hiera-eyaml keys, credentials embedded in manifests, PuppetDB contents, and often cloud or vault tokens used by lookup backends.
- CA material. On servers that also act as the CA, the attacker gets the CA private key, so they can issue certificates for any node.
Config-management servers rarely get the EDR coverage or log review that domain controllers get, even though compromising one has the same blast radius.
Mitigation
- Patch now to the versions above. Restart puppetserver after upgrading. The fix doesn’t take effect until the JVM reloads.
- Turn off naive autosigning. Set
autosign = false, or switch to a policy-executable autosigner that validates a pre-shared challenge incsr_attributes.yaml. Until you have patched, Perforce advises against autosigning without strong verification. - Restrict port 8140 to known agent subnets. It should never be reachable from the internet.
- Audit certificates. Run
puppetserver ca list --alland look for certnames you don’t recognise, especially ones signed after November 3. Revoke and clean anything unexplained. - Hunt. Look for oversized or unusual
PUT /puppet/v3/reportrequests in puppetserver access logs,__ptypevalues in report payloads that aren’t standard report or event types, and child processes spawned by the puppetserver JVM (sh,bash,curl,python). Diff your control repo and the deployed code directory (/etc/puppetlabs/code) against Git to catch manifests that were changed out-of-band. - If you find signs of compromise, assume every node that checked in after the intrusion is suspect. Rotate the CA and every secret the server could read.